On the occasion of Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung’s ongoing visit to several European countries, VietNamNet’s Huynh Phan talks with Mr. Bruno Hellendorff, a research fellow for the Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security (GRIP) in Brussels and Dr. Felix Heiduk, research fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, on the role of the European Union (EU) in settling disputes in the East Sea and the possibility of cooperation between the EU and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Huynh Phan: Many argue that the EU seems to have no role in the disputes within the East Asia region, but, at the same time, the EU's politico-economic interests of this region are huge. Do you agree with this opinion, and if yes, why?

Bruno Hellendorff: The EU indeed has tremendous political and economic interests in East Asia, and little political voice. In fact, the EU has long been held in relative neglect when it came to security and political issues in Asia. Many Asian countries still resent what they considered a lack of commitment and consideration from Europe in the many summits and diplomatic happenings that took place over the last decade and a half.

Mr. Bruno Hellendorff

For the EU, stakes are high in East Asia, but the engagement of the region has been constrained by the disconnection between its foreign and security policies and its trade policies (the first remain in the hands of nation states, the second in the hands of the European commission).

Not only have those policies been disconnected, but European member states have also diverged considerably in their respective foreign and security policies vis-à-vis East Asia. The ensuing cacophony among (and within) European member states and European institutions led East Asian partners to focus on those issues in which the EU voice was clear: trade.

Still, today, the EU is trying to “get back in the game” on new premises (the Treaty of Lisbon instituted a unified foreign and security policy, to be conducted by a unified diplomatic service – the European External Action Service). And this is an interesting development.  

Felix Heiduk: It depends. Yes, the EU is no major player in the political-security realm in Southeast Asia. And this is very unlikely to change anytime soon.

That said the EU, being a political (and even more so a military) dwarf in the region, is a strong economic player. A number of European states (especially the big three: UK, France, Germany, but also other EU member states like Italy) have established intense trade relations with Southeast Asian states like Vietnam or Indonesia, among others. However, this is not the case for all EU member states.

Nonetheless, at the EU level, as illustrated in the recently published EU maritime strategy, the EU lists a number of core interests – two of which could be linked with the conflict in the East Sea: “peaceful settlement of maritime disputes” and “preservation of freedom of navigation, the protection of the global EU supply chain and of maritime trade, the right of innocent and transit passage of ships and the security of their crew and passengers”.

The EU’s interest in maintaining freedom of navigation and the protection of the EU supply chain could potentially be adversely affected by an outbreak of armed confrontation in the East Sea.

Huynh Phan: What are the EU's interests in the East Sea? Has EU applied policies, or intended to do so, on the current disputes?

Bruno Hellendorff: The EU interests in the East Sea are above all related to the freedom of navigation. Most of its trade to and from East Asia (China, South Korea, Japan) transits through the East Sea. Peace and stability in the area is thus critical to both the security and prosperity of the EU.

The defense of a rule-based order in the region is also not just a means of achieving this, it is also a goal for a multilateral, supranational actor like the EU. At the lower level, EU companies and firms are heavily involved in defense procurement processes in the region.

Felix Heiduk: The EU’s core interests as inferred from the EU’s Maritime Security Strategy are ensuring freedom of navigation in important sea lanes in the region as well as the peaceful settlement of ongoing maritime disputes in accordance with international law in the region.

To my knowledge there is no clearly devised policy from Brussels on the East Sea (other than the very general points I referred to above) for the time being. However you might want to direct your inquiry directly to Brussels on this matter.

Huynh Phan: ASEAN's countries are seeking political and diplomatic support from the EU in the disputes. The visit by Philippine President Aquino to the EU in September and the ongoing visit to the EU by Vietnamese PM Nguyen Tan Dung have clearly confirmed the intention. Do you think that the ASEAN's intention seems to be too ambitious?

Bruno Hellendorff: I think that ASEAN itself presents a not-so-united front. Internal dissensions and disputes retain their importance. Malaysia has an East Sea policy much different from that of Vietnam or the Philippines. The work done by Indonesia’s diplomacy is not enough to cover this.

Nevertheless, ASEAN is committed to rule of law and to the peaceful settlement of disputes, and its members all agree that UNCLOS should be a basis for cooperation.

In this framework, looking to EU support is good strategy. However, the EU has a strategic partnership with China – which it has not with ASEAN – and will therefore not antagonize China over the East Sea. The EU will not balance China. Any hope on ASEAN’s part to achieve it – in the legal, political or economic fields – would be far too ambitious indeed.

Felix Heiduk: Well, in my view some (not all) ASEAN members are seeking international support or actively following a strategy of internationalization of the conflict. Others (i.e. Cambodia) oppose such moves or show indifference about it. Hence ASEAN, and this seems to be a most crucial point here, is divided on the South Sea issue.

Dr. Felix Heiduk

Hence, unless there is a regional maritime security strategy supported by all ASEAN members, efforts to internationalize the conflict by the government in Manila, for example, are likely to remain futile. Plus, we need to mention the elephant in the room: China. Beijing has so far shown little willingness to treat the East Sea conflict in any other way other than as a bilateral issue. This has not exactly increased the leverage of other actors (including the EU).

Huynh Phan: What do think, in the most practical way, are the areas that the EU and ASEAN, particularly Vietnam, can cooperate to accelerate the management of the East Sea disputes in a peaceful manner?

Bruno Hellendorff: UNCLOS and rule of law are topics of collaboration of prime importance to both the EU and ASEAN (and Vietnam). It will be important to monitor the China-Philippines arbitration case in the first place, and see if the EU positions itself vis-à-vis this case.

The EU can help Vietnam in the interpretation of state obligations under UNCLOS vis-à-vis the East Sea, and demonstrate how, for instance, joint exploitation of resources is not a legal problem but a political one.

Legal tools are there, and they are many, to help settle disputes. If settlement is not possible, the EU can help in the design of conflict management processes and procedures.

Bringing this in the ongoing political dialogue is inevitably useful for Vietnam, as it would – with very little doubt – lead to the assessment that Chinese claims are vague, and inconsistent with the law of the sea. In short, the EU can help Vietnam and ASEAN claim the moral high ground in East Sea disputes.

In a geopolitical perspective, Vietnam is already engaged in warmer and warmer talks with the US: being at the center of and pushing for a US-EU rapprochement on the East Sea would therefore be very beneficial for Vietnam.  

Felix Heiduk: I do think that the EU, while not directly involved in the conflict, could potentially play a bigger role, i.e,. sharing its experiences and best practices in areas with regard to territorial conflicts, joined resource exploitation, fishery rights, etc.

Furthermore, the EU managed to play a positive role as a neutral, honest broker in partnership with ASEAN during the Aceh peace agreement in 2005 successfully. Soft power tools like the ones I just mentioned could be applied by the EU in cooperation with the conflicting parties in order to support peaceful settlement of the ongoing territorial disputes.

However, this is not a role the EU can simply impose on the conflicting parties.

Huynh Phan: Thank you!

* Bruno Hellendorff is a research fellow for the Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security (GRIP) in Brussels and a PhD candidate at the Université Catholique de Louvain (UCL), Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium. His research focuses on the linkages between natural resources, conflict and peacebuilding processes, China’s Africa strategy and security issues in Asia-Pacific.

* Felix Heiduk is a lecturer at the University of Birmingham. Before coming to Birmingham he was a research fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, as well as a postdoc fellow at Harvard’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs. He received his doctorate from Free University Berlin in 2008.