Dr. Tran Cong Truc, former Head of the Government Boundary Committee.

The East Sea is the center of relations between Vietnam and the two superpowers – the US and China. The East Sea is heating up not only due to Beijing’s escalation and expansion in pursuing and imposing its absurd and illegal U-shaped line with many dangerous tricks, but also because of the absence of actual progress after the meeting between Xi and US President Obama.
Before the Sino - US summit, the region entrusted a lot of hope in the White House on the commitment to enforce international law and order, peace and stability, marine and aviation security and safety in the East Sea. 

Obama had also made statements condemning China’s behaviors of escalation and disruption of the status quo to create the so-called the "new normal status" in the East Sea through illegal consolidation, construction and militarization on many reefs and shoals to turn them into artificial islands in the Truong Sa Archipelago (international known as the Spratly Islands).

Obama and many US senior officials had called on Beijing to clarify the nature and legal grounds for its U-shaped line, which claims "sovereignty" for up to 90% of the East Sea. However, the statements delivered by Xi Jinping at the White House showed that China is even more extravagant and provocative and thus, the East Sea situation will be more complicated.

This urged the public to raise the question: Did Obama and Xi barter something in the East Sea and if so, what were they?

The two things that Xi wanted to barter with the US 

Xi Jinping and aBarack Obam.

Xi’s public statements about the East Sea made before and during the US visit consisted of three main points:

Firstly, confirming the so-called "sovereignty" over Vietnam’s Truong Sa Archipelago to defend its illegal actions of turning reefs into artificial islands and military bases there. This means that China can do what it wants to do in Truong Sa as they said that Truong Sa is its "territory".

Secondly, Xi declared that the construction, consolidation and installation of "equipment" on the artificial islands in Truong Sa does not affect nor is against any country. In fact this is just the quibble of the Chinese leader because most international experts, scholars, and observers have realized the threat to security, peace, stability and international law and order caused by China in the East Sea.

Thirdly, Xi pledged no militarization, and even committed to "protect freedom and safety of navigation" in the East Sea in order to reduce concern and delay the response of the US.
Based on these statements, we can see the first thing that Xi really wanted to barter with the US is the this country’s "tacit recognition" of China’s claims over Vietnam’s Truong Sa Archipelago, the existence of artificial islands and construction works and equipment on the seven rocks and reefs in Truong Sa, and the application of the rules on 12 nautical mile territorial waters of natural islands for China’s seven artificial islands.

Earlier, the US Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, the chairman of the Senate armed forces committee John McCain, the commander of the US Pacific Fleet Admiral Scott Swift and the Commander of the US Pacific Command Harry Harris had repeatedly said that the US would conduct aviation and marine patrol in any international airspace and waters that the international law does not prohibit.

This range includes the waters and airspace within a radius of 12 nautical miles around the reefs, which have a maximum of 500 meters of safety that China has built illegally in Truong Sa. Obama had also spoke about this possibility. But all have stopped at statements.

Xi Jinping wished that this would not happen, so that at least China will have more time to strengthen and further militarize the seven illegal artificial islands. In the long run, the US’ "tacit recognition" will reinforce China’s position in the East Sea. When the US has a new president, everything will be done.

The seven artificial islands and the military fortresses built by China on them are believed to become the easy prey for US missiles if a large-scale war occurs in the East Sea. But actually there is no reason to promote such a scenario, while these artificial islands and military fortresses are extremely dangerous in small clashes that are created accidentally or intentionally by China in this region.

The second thing for exchange in the East Sea between China and the US in the secret meeting between Xi and Obama on September 24 might be the adoption of regulations on unplanned encounters at sea between naval vessels and military aircraft of the two countries with the vessels of the China Coast Guard.

This is Xi’s desire, but if this happens, the consequence will be extremely bad. Admiral Scott Swift revealed this possibility on August 26. In 2014 China and the US signed the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea and the US is interested in the expansion of this code because of activities of the Chinese Coast Guard in the East Sea.

The issue is the scope of application for the Chinese Coast Guard in the East Sea. Certainly, China wants to apply it for the entire waters within the U-shaped line. If the US agrees, then Beijing can see it the US has tacit recognition of the U-shaped line.

Chinese Navy Commander Wu Shengli supported the idea of the US, but saying that he was incompetent to decide. Did Xi just make a decision about it and put it on the negotiation table with Obama on September 24?

Before the statements by Xi about the East Sea, the public only saw Obama reiterating what he had said earlier and taking no new action, despite the call for tough response to the acts of escalation of China from the Pentagon and the US Senate Armed Services Committee. If the US does nothing in the East Sea, it will be a great success of Xi during this trip.

In turn, Xi Jinping might outstretch good bait for the Americans. It is very likely China will quietly ignore, even support the US in other international matters and hotspots such as the Middle East, IS, North Korea...

China could also commit to share with the US the costs and responsibility in the operation of the United Nations. The huge financial and military commitments that Xi stated in the joint press conference with Obama and before the UN General Assembly session indicated this possibility.

Thirdly, Xi made a commitment that will never come true, which is not militarizing Truong Sa, ensuring freedom, safety of navigation and aviation in the East Sea, beyond 12 nautical miles around the artificial islands. China might even commit to not cause war or major conflicts with the allies and partners that the US has committed to protect or help.

If these happen, it is obvious that the US indifferently gave a hand to China to destroy the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 that humanity took a lot of effort, time and money to build, only with the implicit recognition of the 12 nautical miles of territorial waters around artificial islands with the safe radius of just 500 meters.

Worse, for the US’s tacit recognition of the U-shaped line, i.e. the recognition of the East Sea as China’s pond, will China commit to grant free transportation for US vessels?

Once China realizes this, it means that the US accepts China’s role as the baron in the East Sea, and the international order and order in the Asia - Pacific region after World War II that was formed and protected by the US will be broken. More importantly, the trust of allies and partners of the US in the region, which has been shaken, will collapse completely.

Meanwhile, the bait given by China is just pies on paper. For example, in the case of the Korean Peninsula, despite the view that Pyongyang is economically dependent on Beijing, the independence and swaggering attitude of Kim Jong-un before Zhongnanhai showed that he is not a vassal politician.

Hopefully this is just my own excessive worrying, and actually the Americans also understand what it will get and lose in this. But Obama’s term is ending, while Putin and Xi Jinping are holding each other’s hands very tightly. So the US may be hesitant in making response against swift developments in the East Sea.

What is the status of the East Sea and US-VN-China relations after Xi Jinping’s US visit?

A cost of the China Coast Guard infringed Vietnam's waters during the 981 oil rig crisis.

Skepticism is probably the general mood of the Vietnamese, the Americans and the Chinese about their opponents and their partners in the relationships that revolve around the happenings in the East Sea. 

For Vietnam, doubt and worry has increased after Xi’s visit to the US where he made statements challenging the sovereignty of Vietnam over Truong Sa, dodged the issue of Hoang Sa Archipelago (internationally known as the Paracel Islands) and sought to shake hands with the US.

Vietnam-US relations have developed strongly in recent years, especially since the Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong’s official visit to the US. However, through my talks with US scholars, researchers, as well as the statements of the US politicians and officials, I see that Americans are still skeptical of Vietnam's goodwill as well as Vietnam's foreign policy.

With Vietnam’s current position, it is impossible for Vietnam to make alliance with this country against the other country. Vietnam must diversify its international relations, shake hands with the big countries, with neighboring countries, and with friendly countries. Vietnam does not want to become victims of "geopolitical competition" of the great powers. Hopefully, Americans understand and share this with Vietnam.

But once someone uses military power to threaten the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and threaten to make war against Vietnam (as the recent warning by Joshua Kurlantzick from the US Council on Foreign Relations about the possibility of conflict between Vietnam and China), then I personally think that Vietnam will have to find ways to protect itself, even to consider an alliance with the US.

In Vietnam – China relations, mistrust is even greater. The vigilance of the Vietnamese over the expansion activities of China in the East Sea has increased tremendously after the HD-981 oil rig event last year as well as what has been happening in Truong Sa and Hoang Sa archipelagoes.
China has long sought to put Vietnam within their sphere of influence and does not want Vietnam to develop cooperative relations with other major powers, especially the US and Japan.

Chinese media has publicly commented on this and even “intimidated” in the argument of the “great China”. But it could not prevent the trend of integration and development of foreign, security and defense relations of Vietnam with the US, Japan and other countries.

China itself is escalating and expanding in the East Sea; China is trying to develop and show military strength in the East Sea; and China also owns the biggest forces of the Coast Guard, which is a type of disguised armed forces, in the region, which has forced all coastal countries in the region, not just Vietnam, to find ways to improve their defense capabilities. Cooperation with the US, Japan and other countries certainly becomes the preferred choice.

According to various sources, it is likely that both US President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping will pay official visits to Vietnam. These will be challenges and also opportunities for Vietnam to clearly show its stance.

Dr. Tran Cong Truc