VietNamNet would like to introduce our readers an article about conflicts in the South and East China Sea by the former U.S. Ambassador to Germany James D. Bindenagel, published on the US-based Boston Global Forum.

Bindenagel believed that the resurgence of nationalism past which lurks behind modern leaders’ mind is the truly root of  the world’s current conflicts and imposes dangerous challenge to the liberal international order that exists today. It also explains the China’s acts in the East and South China Sea (East Sea). He also summed up results of the Boston Global Forum Initiative’s online conference which was on July 2 aiming at building a framework for peace and security in the Pacific, and suggested  the Scenario model to deal with conflicts. 

Conflict in the Western Pacific has captured world attention. Conflict over competing claims for the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea have surfaced and led to confrontation.

It is ominous that China and Japan are currently so keen on butting heads. Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe recently likened the tensions between Japan and China to the relationship between Germany as a rising power challenging the United Kingdom 100 years ago. People throughout Asia must nervously reflect on the hard lessons the Europeans learned.  Europeans are revisiting the Great War on the 100th anniversary of its outbreak in August 1914 when Gavrilo Princip, a local terrorist in Serbia, not one of the major belligerent countries, assassinated the Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria and launched a global war. The failure of European leadership a century ago brought calamity to Europe.

However, behind leadership lurks the ghost of nationalisms past. Rising nationalism, which has turned out badly in history, is a dangerous challenge to the liberal international order that exists today.  The Europeans have indeed seen the rise again of ethnic nationalism coupled with the use of force employed by the Russians in Ukraine and recall the wars in Yugoslavia.  They will also look to China/Japan as those countries manage the historical humiliations suffered by China and the inability of the Japanese apologies to win acceptance and get past the past. Nationalism is enticing for leaders looking for quick internal support.

The lack of recognition of the wartime conquest of Nanjing and Prime Minister Abe’s visit to the controversial Yasukuni shrine remain significant symbols of lack of justice for China.  Japan and China seem caught in a cultural context where shame is associated with apology and the wounds of the Second World War sow seeds of nationalism.

Nationalism has arisen also in Europe where Russian President Vladimir Putin’s effort to shape current history based on Gorbachev’s failure to prevent the collapse of the Soviet Union – in his mind, the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century” — may be completely misguided, but it is important to understand what drives him.  After all, the sense of affliction and the appeal of ethnic nationalism are not just in his mind, but in the minds of many Russians.

It is apparent that President Xi is promoting a return to the Chinese Nationalist past, including recognition of Confucius.  There is increased interest in traditional Chinese culture to stabilize the country in the aftermath of great change, growing nationalism at the cost of rule of law and collaboration with neighbors takes the country in the wrong direction.  President Xi has set out to achieve “a Chinese dream” of a “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” The first three priorities, according to him, are: restoring Taiwan to China, regaining the Diaoyu or Senkaku islands from Japan; and “taking back sovereignty of the South China Sea,” which is disputed by more than 10 countries.  China is pressing its claims backed by force and undermining its peaceful rise to global power status.  

The recent unilateral Chinese National Overseas Oil Company (CNOOC) placement of a deep-sea oil rig to assert its claims to the disputed Paracel Islands alarmed the United States, Vietnam and others in East Asia. Despite all the anti-China sentiment and the overwhelming desire to defend its maritime territory, Vietnam has few options.  Hanoi knows it needs stable relations with China and looks to the United States to support stability in the region. China's neighbors may be forced to seek outside assistance and military cooperation to counterbalance a more aggressive China.

Defusing Conflict in the South and East China Seas

China is moving forward with unilateral energy exploration in the South China Sea and is using the placement of a deep-sea oil rig to assert its claims to the disputed Paracel Islands. The move has concerned Vietnam, which also claims the waters and islands in that area, and the United States. Beijing's decision will likely prompt Vietnam to deploy its coast guard or naval vessels to assert its own claim to the area and accelerate its efforts to draw in foreign partners for oil exploration and production. But Beijing is calculating that Vietnam will be unwilling and unable to make any serious attempt to stop the Chinese drilling.

According to Stratfor analysts, Beijing continues to rely on its growing military and technological capabilities to test its maritime boundaries. Along with responses and reactions from neighboring countries and outside parties, this military reliance will continue to shape the region's security environment, even though Beijing is maneuvering carefully to avoid outright conflict while exerting its authority.

China took control of the Paracel Island chain in the 1970s, but it did not begin to formally enforce its claim until the late 2000s, when it undertook a broader, more aggressive maritime expansion plan. Beijing stepped up its military presence in and around the islands and established the Sansha administrative region, which encompasses the Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands and the Macclesfield Bank, and falls under the jurisdiction of Hainan province, as a symbol of China's de facto control.

The case of the Paracels is just one example of how Beijing is firming up its presence in the South China Sea and gradually eroding other claimants' ability to challenge its supremacy. But even as Beijing ambitiously claims the entire South China Sea, bounded by the so-called nine-dash line, it has no real presence on any island (besides a few atolls and reefs) in the distant Spratly Island chain. In addition to China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei and Taiwan have claims in the island chain. China's navy is not good enough to overcome the logistical challenges such distances present, so its ability to project its dominance throughout the maritime sphere is limited.

Instead, Beijing's strategy seems to consist of three steps. First, it uses the nine-dash line as a historical justification for its intrusions into disputed waters. Second, it enforces its claim in tactically advantageous areas where it has an actual presence, such as the Paracels and the Scarborough Shoal, which it seized from the Philippines in 2012. Third, it continues to develop its military and technological capabilities to carefully push its maritime boundaries farther without antagonizing all of its neighbors at once. (Stratfor, May 8, 2014 “China Uses Deep-Sea Oil Exploration to Push Its Maritime Claims”)

The escalation of Chinese engagement in the Paracel Islands and off the coasts of Vietnam and the Philippines is a call for options to defuse the conflict and prevent armed conflict.

Despite growing nationalism that threatens China’s peaceful rise, efforts should be made to work cooperatively with China -- not to contain it.   Japan, China, and others (Vietnam, Philippines) should set aside the unresolved issues and turn to joint management of national interests in fishing, energy and resource development.  Codes of conduct in the East and South China Sea are necessary to manage maritime operations.  Joint maritime policing, adherence to the Law of the Sea and maintenance of the freedom of the seas for shipping, could also help to avoid political miscalculation and military confrontation.  Most important, the Chinese, Japanese and regional leaders should set aside the use of force to resolve tension, such as those over the Paracels, Senkaku/Diaoyu, and other Islands.

The Boston Global Forum should convene and craft a framework for dispute resolution, including a conference on the issues and a dialog that could address engagement among the parties.  

What practical engagement steps could break the stalemate and avoid conflict?

There are three dimensions that encompass the conflict.  Adam Kahane outlines them in his book “Solving Tough Problems” as dynamically, generatively, and socially complex.  The problem is dynamically complex stemming from history where cause and effect are far apart in space and time.  It is generatively complex as it unfolds in unfamiliar and unpredictable ways.  And it is socially complex because people see the problem differently and the problem has become polarized and stuck.

Ezra Vogel’s five questions frame the work well. First, prevent explosive conflicts; 2) deal with practical issues of environment, maritime management, resource development; 3) develop Asian “ownership” of the issue through International Court of Justice; 4) create new structures; 5) defuse emotional issues of history, especially WWII reconciliation.

As Michael Fuchs noted States have the first level of responsibility to prevent explosive conflicts.  And there is high level involvement in regional meetings as well as efforts for institutions to take on practical mechanisms for cooperation, especially in maritime capacity building and trust/confidence building measures. Solutions and components of the Boston Global Forum Framework for governments to address include developing deeper cooperation and collaboration by:

- Agreeing on rule of law for resolution of disputes is a primary commitment not to use force to resolve disputes.  Adhering to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and implementing international law and conventions about territories and skies as well as the Code of Conduct and an international convention/ law on cyber and data security.

- Building international structures for consultation, negotiation and cooperation that have enough power and rights to judge and re-enforce countries respect laws can conventions.  States can build and are building on the East Asian Summit, ASEAN, ASEAN Regional Forums, and ASEAN +3 (China, Japan, South Korea) with observers from U.S., India, Australia and New Zealand.  China, Japan and South Korea could create a Trilateral Group to address regional issues in East and North East Asia.

There are many issues to be addressed including, enhancing transparency in government policies, granting information rights/data protection of people in all countries, and managing jointly large marine ecosystems.

- Integrating Asian economies into the global economy through the WTO, International Financial Institutions (IFIs), and regional economies as well as agreeing on the Transpacific Partnership (TPP) and rules of global governance.  Cooperation among states can also improve rights, safety, and life conditions of workers and promote Corporate Social Responsibility.

- Assuring regional security calls for the United States presence not to undermine China’s peaceful rise.  Building a multilateral framework for security discussions such as the Munich Security Conference or the German Marshall Fund Brussels Forum offer models.  The U.S. remains a Pacific power and will be engaged with all the parties in the region to play its role in maintaining peace and security.  The Financial Times (May 2, 2014) reported that the “US president’s approach is clear enough. Washington’s response to China’s rise has been to engage and hedge – to seek to draw Beijing into the international system while refurbishing its own regional alliances. More recently, Chinese assertiveness in the East and South China Seas has led US policy to tilt towards a sturdier “engage and compete”.  

- Assisting in reconciliation, especially for historical grievances, is a pre-condition for regional security Unresolved conflicts are the seeds of nationalism and new confrontation such as those on-going over the Senkakus, Paracel, Spratley Islands and the Scarborough Reef.  US and European efforts on World War II reconciliation projects have contributed to the regional peace in Europe for 70 years.  The BGF Framework should include regional structures where bi-lateral disputes can be discussed.  Exchange programs for culture,  music and art between countries face-to-face and through the Internet .  In addition to young leaders, the countries’ leaders should prepare a white paper on each one’s understanding of their historic relations and contributions to peaceful relations since 1974. The Gulf of Tonkin-Hainan agreement between China and Vietnam is one example of a common approach can grow form shared historical narratives that can lead to better understanding,

The Boston Global Forum could have several roles. First, as in planned in Vietnam, BGF is providing a platform for international discussion of these issues and can influence the governments involved. Second, as Ambassador Shinji Yanai noted BGF could meet on a Track II or Track 1.5 basis face-to-face and address some of these issues as Tom Patterson outlined – China and the new Asia-Pacific security structure; what support the U.S. could give to smaller countries without upsetting China; and what role should smaller countries play.  Third, I would suggest national/multinational scenario projects to create visions of the outcomes of the political developments with the aim not of predicting the future but to influence the outcome, to create possibilities and avoid resignation into powerlessness.

Scenarios to Shape the Future

The scenario model I suggest is based on Adam Kahane’s work with several countries, notably the South Africans in their peaceful transition avoiding the racial war so many predicted.  Elements of such a long-term project include:

-    Inviting leaders (mid-level) from business, academia and government to create scenarios.

-    Call for Scenarios address a threatening problem

-    Key perspectives are represented

-    National leaders endorse the project

-    Workshops for scenarios/stories of what the group wants in the future

-    Discussion among participants on what is plausible, not that the scenario can’t happen

-    Retreat atmosphere with free time for sharing thought

-    Sub-teams created for expanded discussion over 3 months

-    Presentations to political leadership with competing scenarios

-    National conversations

I personally participated in a similar process hosted by the Aspen Institute Berlin in the 1980’s and have found the mid-level participants involved in key decisions shaping the post-Berlin Wall world.

Justification

Despite growing nationalism that threatens China’s peaceful rise, efforts should be made to work cooperatively with China -- not to contain it.   Japan, China, and others (Vietnam, Philippines) should set aside the unresolved issues and turn to joint management of national interests in fishing, energy and resource development.  Codes of conduct in the East and South China Sea are necessary to manage maritime operations.  Joint maritime policing, adherence to the Law of the Sea and maintenance of the freedom of the seas for shipping, could also help to avoid political miscalculation and military confrontation.  Most important, the Chinese, Japanese and regional leaders should set aside the use of force to resolve tension, such as those over the Paracels, Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, Scarborough Reef and other disputes.

Japan has a special role to address post WWII reconciliation and, “could and should have done much more to give real substance to its apologies, as the Germans have done. At least since 1970, Germany has taken a comprehensive and credible approach to atoning for its Nazi past, fully acknowledging its horrors in school curricula, graphically commemorating them in museums, monuments, and ceremonies, and employing official discourse that has been unfailingly contrite.” (Lionel Barber, FT)

There is no denying that China suffered humiliation from the Japanese Imperial Army invasion in the Sino-Japanese Wars and is particular bitter about the rape of Nanjing. Little wonder, given the absence of acceptance of the apology from Japan, that the Second World War continues to feed Chinese anger.  The longer term challenge, whether then in Europe with Russian ethnic nationalism or in Asia with Chinese nationalism, is how to turn enmity into amity. Then as now, the best way to proceed is to begin with small steps in the resolution of many disputes. And this is where Japan's Prime Minister must do much more than (implicitly) point the finger at China.

The parties should engage with each other in clarifying narrative to promote mutual understanding and prevent angry populisms and xenophobic nationalism that can rebound to destroy leaders and countries.  The United States should provide needed leadership among parties to create and share historical narratives that can lead to better understanding.

One way to better understanding can come from scenario building or storytelling, which are powerful tools.  Scenarios should be built for Japan, Vietnam and China identifying young leaders from politics, business and academia to come together frequently to present their narratives and share comprehensive discussions on a broad range of issues to strengthen mutual understanding and cooperation.

James D. Bindenagel